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SCOTT V. SANDFORD: THE COURT'S MOST DREADFUL
CASE AND How IT CHANGED HISTORY Paul Finkelman 3
Dred Scott, without doubt, is the most controversial case in the history of the
United States Supreme Court. Unlike the controversies that surround other deci-
sions of the Court, the controversy surrounding Dred Scott does not turn on if the
outcome or Chief Justice Taney's analysis was wrong, but rather on why the out-
come and Chief Justice Taney's analysis were wrong. This article focuses on the
political goals Taney attempted to accomplish through his decision in Dred Scott.
Though there existed reasons for Taney's belief that his decision in Dred Scott
would once and for all end the political debate over slavery in the territories, his
decision ultimately served as a key catalyst in creating the crisis that led to Abra-
ham Lincoln's election, secession, civil war, and, ultimately, the end of slavery.
THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOKING AT
DRED SCOTT Jack M. Balkin 49
and Sanford Levinson
Dred Scott v. Sanford is a classic case that is relevant to almost every impor-
tant question of contemporary constitutional theory.
Dred Scott connected race to social status, to citizenship, and to being a part
of the American people. One hundred fifty years later these connections still
haunt us; and the twin questions of who is truly American and who America be-
longs to still roil our national debates.
Dred Scott is a case about threats to national security and whether the Consti-
tution is a suicide pact. It concerns whether the Constitution follows the flag and
whether constitutional rights obtain in federally held lands overseas. And it asks
whether, as Chief Justice Taney famously said of blacks, there are indeed some
people who have no rights we Americans are bound to respect.
Dred Scott remains the most salient example in debates over the legitimacy of
substantive due process. It subverts our intuitions about the relative merits of
originalism and living constitutionalism. It symbolizes the problem of constitu-
tional evil and the question whether responsibility for great injustices lies in the
Constitution itself or in the judges who apply it.
Finally, Dred Scott encapsulates the central problems of judicial review in a
constitutional democracy. On the one hand, Dred Scott raises perennial questions
about the judicial role in cases of profound moral and political disagreement, and
about judicial responsibility for the backlash and political upheaval that may result
from judicial review. On the other hand, the political context of the Dred Scott
decision suggests that the Supreme Court rarely strays far from the wishes of the
dominant national political coalition. It raises the unsettling possibility that, given
larger social and political forces, what courts do in highly contested cases is far less
important than we imagine.
DRED SCOTT AND THE CRISIS OF 1860 Louise Weinberg 97
Recent suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Dred Scott decision
and the controversy over the extension of slavery into the territories were at the
very center of the crisis of 1860. This paper fills in the social, political, economic,
and legal backgrounds of that crisis in order to clarify the centrality of Dred Scott
in the election of Abraham Lincoln and to the ensuing destruction of the Union.
RETHINKING DRED SCOTT:
NEW CONTEXT FOR AN OLD CASE Austin Allen 141
Scholars have misunderstood the context in which Dred Scott emerged. Lead-
ing historical interpretations of the decision have relied too heavily on accounts
developed by antebellum Republicans and on mid-twentieth-century legal theory.
This article offers an alternative account of Dred Scott's origins and argues that
the decision emerged from a series of unintended consequences resulting from the
Taney Court's efforts to incorporate a Jacksonian vision of governance into consti-
tutional law. By 1857, this effort had generated tensions that made a sweeping
decision like Dred Scott nearly unavoidable. The inescapable nature of Dred Scott
carries implications for constitutional theorists, especially those calling for the
Court to adhere to minimalist interpretive strategies or stark distinctions between
law and politics, because such theories cannot evade future decisions like Dred
Scott. A departmental constitutionalism providing ample room for extrajudicial
interpretation to challenge malevolent Court decisions, however, may be able to
limit the reach of future Dred Scotts.
THE NEW FICTION: DRED SCOTT AND THE
LANGUAGE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY Mark A. Graber 177
Claims that the Justices in Dred Scott abandoned a tradition of judicial re-
straint rely on an anachronistic measure for judicial activism. Antebellum Justices
asserted that laws were unconstitutional only when restraining state officials. Judi-
cial etiquette, in their opinion, required more circumspection when imposing con-
stitutional limits on a coordinate branch of the national government. Contrary to
accepted wisdom, the Justices before the Civil War imposed constitutional limita-
tions on federal power in approximately twenty cases. They did so, however, with-
out explicitly declaring federal legislation unconstitutional. The Justices in some
federal cases ignored the plain meaning of federal statutes on the ground that
Congress would always be presumed to have intended to act constitutionally, as
constitutionality was defined by the Supreme Court. In other cases, Justices deter-
mined that the federal government could not constitutionally engage in some ac-
tivity without determining whether Congress by statute had authorized that
activity. These and other techniques were means by which the Supreme Court
could announce constitutional limits on the national government while pretending
that no constitutional conflict was taking place between national elected officials
and federal Justices. The majority and concurring opinions in Dred Scott broke
with past judicial practice only by explicitly declaring, when limiting federal
power, that the national legislature had passed an unconstitutional law. Their ac-
tual ruling, if not their language, was consistent with previous cases imposing con-
stitutional limits on the federal government.
DRED ScoTT- TIERED CITIZENSHIP AND
TIERED PERSONHOOD Henry L. Chambers, Jr. 209
The Dred Scott Court accepted and perpetuated the notion that our Constitu-
tion afforded multiple tiers of citizenship and multiple tiers of personhood
through which different groups of citizens and different groups of persons would
receive varying sets of rights. Through their language and interpretation, the Re-
construction Amendments largely resolved this issue by providing a formal equal-
ity that created a single tier of citizenship and a single tier of personhood. Though,
as a formal matter, tiered citizenship and tiered personhood are unacceptable, the
issue is not fully resolved as a practical matter. Tiered citizenship and tiered per-
sonhood may exist when the exercise of certain citizenship or personhood rights is
limited. If the limitation on rights is justified, multiple tiers of citizenship or per-
sonhood have not been created; if the limitation is not justified, multiple tiers have
been created. After a brief discussion of Dred Scott and the Reconstruction
Amendments, this essay urges that any restrictions on the exercise of citizenship
rights or rights traditionally considered rights of personhood be clearly justified,
rather than merely explained. Without the full justification of such restrictions,
various laws may appear to reflect a Dred Scott mindset that accepts the unjusti-
fied provision of differential rights to groups of citizens and persons on the basis of
governmental fiat and societal bias, rather than a post-Reconstruction Amend-
ment mindset that guarantees equality.
THE EMERGENCE OF EQUALITY AS
A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE:
THE FIRST CENTURY William M. Wiecek 233
Equality as a constitutional value was unprecedented when it made its ap-
pearance in 1868 in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
reflected antebellum abolitionist ideals adopted hesitantly by Northern Republi-
cans during Reconstruction, but these were incompatible with the expectations of
most white Americans of the era, as well as with all previous American exper-
iences. In this sense, equality was a revolutionary constitutional value. The framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the Equal Protection Clause and its em-
bedded ideal of interracial equality to reverse the racist dicta of the Dred Scott
opinion, to validate the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and to empower Congress to
suppress counterrevolutionary violence aimed at the freedpeople and Unionists
throughout the South. Regrettably, though, the United States Supreme Court be-
trayed these intentions in a series of restrictive decisions between 1873 and 1905
that had the effect of constitutionalizing the forms of apartheid and servitude that
emerged in this era to subordinate African Americans.
THE LAST ANGRY MAN:
BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS AND
THE DRED SCOTT CASE Earl M. Maltz 265
The dissenting opinion of Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis in Dred Scott has
generally received lavish praise from commentators. Curtis is typically praised not
only for his substantive conclusions, but also for his seemingly dispassionate analy-
sis of the legal issues presented by the case. In many respects, this praise is well-
deserved; Curtis's discussions of the issues of slavery in the territories and citizen-
ship for free blacks are models of legal reasoning. However, a close analysis of
other aspects of his opinion reveals that Curtis's analysis was at times distorted by
his anger with the actions of Chief Justice Taney and other members of the Dred
Scott majority.
BENJAMIN CURTIS: Top OF THE LIST R. Owen Williams 277
Among the many brave and brilliant dissents from the Supreme Court, few
are more historically significant than that of Benjamin Curtis in Dred Scott v.
Sandford. Earl Maltz insists that the traditional view of Curtis as a dispassionate
Justice is incorrect; Curtis is better seen as the "Last Angry Man." This paper
considers the famous dissent, the man who wrote it, and the technical analysis
Maltz claims as sine qua non to a proper understanding of the opinion.
LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY IN DRED ScoTrn.
THE CRISIS OF THE INCOMPLETE
CONSTITUTION Michael P. Zuckert 291
The original Constitution was incomplete in that it contained a disparity be-
tween the principles of legitimacy of the system and the legality of the institution
of slavery. Political communities marked by such disharmony are beset with pres-
sures to make the system consistent in one way or another. Such indeed was the
fate of the U.S. during the antebellum era. Three typical responses arose: to make
legality correspond to legality (by redefining the principles of legitimacy of the
system), to make legality conform to legitimacy (by doing away with slavery), or to
maintain the tension in ever more creative ways. The Dred Scott case represents a
late stage of this dynamic process-seven of the Justices chose one or another
version of the legality-over-legitimacy strategy, one chose a nascent version of the
legitimacy-over-legality position, and only one worked to reaffirm the original
constitutional tension between legality and legitimacy.
WHAT WAS TANEY THINKING?
AMERICAN INDIAN CITIZENSHIP
IN THE ERA OF DRED ScoT Frederick E. Hoxie 329
Historians have often noted that Chief Justice Taney's decision in Dred Scott
juxtaposed a denial of African American rights to citizenship with an assertion
that Native Americans could obtain that status. Explaining this apparently incon-
sistent description of two racial minority groups requires an examination of the
history of Native American classification in the law prior to 1857. This article ar-
gues that political leaders and judges of Taney's generation were committed to the
removal of Indian tribes from eastern states and commonly proposed this removal
as a choice between migrating west or dissolving tribal governments in order to
remain in the East as individuals. The possibility of acquiring state citizenship was
therefore an important argument for pro-removal advocates. The Taney decision
represents an example of the complex racial and national formulations that char-
acterized the decades immediately prior to the Civil War-a period in which
courts and political leaders attempted to define rules for defining "regimes of dif-
ference." At a time when there were no national standards of citizenship and little
sense that federal authdrities could enforce citizenship rights against the actions of
states, judges like Taney created distinctions that tried to preserve fundamental
democratic principles while defending white privilege. Finally, the article uses Ta-
ney's formulation to clarify the arguments of Indian jurists who called for federal
recognition of treaty obligations and who defended tribal citizenship as a mark of
"civilization" and racial progress.
STAY EAST, YOUNG MAN?
MARKET REPERCUSSIONS OF
THE DRED ScoTT DECISION Jenny B. Wahl 361
The Dred Scott decision definitively opened U.S. territories to slavery. This
reduced the probability of westward migration for free-soilers, in part because of
expected effects on land markets. Although land was an important part of a slave-
holder's portfolio, his ability to hold wealth in mobile assets-slaves-meant that
he had a different outlook on internal improvements than his Northern brethren,
as well as a production process that emphasized relatively abundant labor inputs.
Letting slaves into the territories thus led to uncertainty about future land values.
This slowed the flow of Northerners west, dragging present land prices downward.
In turn, uncertainty about the future profitability of westward expansion affected
the value of railroad investments. The downward spiral in stock prices for western
railroads heightened risk in capital markets and ultimately led to financial panic.
Data on migration, land prices, and railroad stock prices suggest that Dred Scott
played an important role in generating the tumultuous times of 1857, ultimately
leading to the election of Abraham Lincoln.
FOREIGN AUTHORITY, AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM, AND THE
DRED Sco-r CASE Sarah H. Cleveland 393
One distinctive feature of the Dred Scott decision for modern readers is the
extent to which the Supreme Court Justices looked to foreign and international
law in support of their decisions. The legal status of a slave who entered a free
jurisdiction was a question that had been confronted by many courts at home and
abroad, and international law had played an important role in American and Eu-
ropean adjudication of slavery questions. The Justices therefore were confronted
with the strikingly modern question of the extent to which U.S. law embraced, or
distinguished itself from, foreign practice. Arguments from foreign and interna-
tional law emerged with respect to four critical questions before the Court: citizen-
ship, choice of law, congressional power in the territories, and due process. With a
few notable exceptions, the Justices agreed that foreign authority was relevant to
their decisions, though they disagreed on the choice of particular authorities and
their application to the facts of the case. No member of the Court adopted the
view that foreign authority was never appropriate to constitutional interpretation.
Even Chief Justice Taney, who asserted a stridently exceptionalist position to hold
that due process protected slavery, also looked to foreign authority-and badly
distorted it-to deny citizenship to free blacks. The article concludes it was not the
use of foreign authority that opened the decision to condemnation. While the deci-
sion illustrates the complexities of nineteenth-century transnational judicial dia-
logue, Chief Justice Taney's opinion stands as a warning that a blind refusal to
consider foreign authorities can be as fraught with hazards as their indiscriminate
use.
STUDENT NOTES
DIVINE INTERVENTION: RE-EXAMINING THE
"ACT OF GOD" DEFENSE IN A POST-
KATRINA WORLD Joel Eagle 459
From the moment of landfall, Hurricane Katrina instantly became synony-
mous with unprecedented damage, destruction, and loss. The exceptionally intense
storm and subsequent flooding in New Orleans and much of the Gulf Coast was
quickly deemed one of the worst disasters in United States history. A particularly
destructive consequence of Hurricane Katrina has been the environmental effects,
in part caused by oil spills and chemical releases from many of the industrial
sources concentrated in the Gulf Coast region.
A question that will likely remain in contention for years or even decades to
come is who should be liable for the cleanup costs associated with these releases?
Congress included an Act of God defense in a number of federal environmental
statutes, offering potentially responsible parties an opportunity to avoid severe
cleanup expenses. This article examines the scope of the defense from various
perspectives-including legislative history, judicial interpretation, and public pol-
icy-and concludes that, when faced with the decision, courts should construe the
defense narrowly and hold sources liable for the cost of cleanup. By holding these
parties strictly liable, cleanups will be efficiently and effectively accomplished, the
cost of cleanup will be borne by those most closely related to the releases, and the
associated costs will act to deter poor facility maintenance and may even lead to
reconsideration of facility placement in the future.
SEARCHING FOR A NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POLICE
DNA DRAGNETS Sepideh Esmaili 495
DNA dragnets-the mass warrantless DNA testing of individuals whom au-
thorities have neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe perpe-
trated a crime, but who merely live or work near a crime scene-have increasingly
been used by police departments in a desperate attempt to solve puzzling crimes.
The lack of success and the Fourth Amendment constitutional concerns raised by
DNA dragnets, however, lead this practice to be suspect. Under the Fourth
Amendment, all searches of an individual must be reasonable. The reasonableness
of any search typically depends on the government obtaining a warrant prior to
the search. While there are well-established exceptions to this rule, DNA dragnets
fail to fall within any of these exceptions. In addition, the consent garnered by
police from suspects does not render these warrantless and suspicionless searches
constitutional, because the consent is not truly voluntary. Law enforcement offi-
cials secure consent from DNA dragnetees under coercive conditions where of-
ficers threaten individuals with police orders and media scrutiny. Also, DNA
dragnets fail to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness balancing test, be-
cause individuals' interests in keeping their genetic and medical information pri-
vate far outweighs any governmental concern in solving and preventing crimes.
Thus, this Note argues that the use of DNA dragnets in the absence of probable
cause and a judicial warrant cannot be upheld as constitutional.
SIGNED GENERAL RELEASES MAY BE
WORTH LESS THAN EMPLOYERS EXPECTED:
CIRCUITS SPLIT ON WHETHER FORMER
EMPLOYEE CAN SIGN RELEASE, REAP
ITS BENEFIT, AND SUE FOR FMLA
CLAIM ANYWAY Muniza Bawaney 525
A circuit split has recently developed regarding the correct interpretation of
29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d), a regulation issued pursuant to the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, which states in pertinent part, "Employees cannot waive, nor
may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under FMLA." The Fifth
Circuit correctly concluded that 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) bars only the prospective
waiver of substantive rights under the FMLA and does not reach the post-dispute
release or settlement of FMLA claims. Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit alterna-
tively concluded that § 825.220(d) prohibits the prospective and retrospective
waiver or release of both the substantive and proscriptive FMLA rights, except
where prior approval from a court or the Department of Labor is obtained. In its
amicus curiae brief, the Department of Labor itself stated that the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of § 825.220(d) was "erroneous," recognizing that the regulation's
proper construction bars only the prospective waiver of FMLA rights, not the pri-
vate settlement of past FMLA claims.
This comment argues that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of § 825.220(d) is
correct based upon the regulation's plain language, legislative history, and public
policy considerations. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's decision leads to a more prac-
tical and efficient result for not only employers and employees, but also the courts
and the Department of Labor. The Fourth Circuit has recently agreed to a panel
rehearing of its earlier decision and should take this opportunity to follow the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning and reach the correct result, therefore resolving the cir-
cuit split.
